Showing posts with label Value of growth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Value of growth. Show all posts

Tuesday, 29 May 2012

How much is growth worth?

In my last post, I looked at the price being paid for growth by valuing the assets in place in a business. To make this judgment, I assumed that the business would pay its entire operating income to claim holders (as dividends to stockholders and interest expenses to lenders). The value of assets in place then becomes the value of the earnings in perpetuity, discounted back at the cost of capital.

So, what is the effect of growth on value? To grow in the long term, you have to reinvest some or a big portion of your earnings back into the business, and the amount you have to reinvest will depend upon the return on capital you earn on your new investments:
Reinvestment Rate = Expected Growth rate/ Return on Capital
Thus, a firm with a return on capital of 15% that wants to grow 3% a year will have to reinvest 20% (= 3%/15%) of its operating income back each year. Investors will thus get less in cash flows up front but have higher cash flows in future years.

Consider an example. A firm that generates $ 10 million in after-tax operating income, and has a cost of capital of 10%, will have a value of assets in place of $100 million, if it pursues a "no growth" policy:
Value of assets in place = $10 million/ .10 = $100 million
If it decides to pursue a 3% growth rate and invest 20% of its after-tax income (based upon the return on capital of 15%), its value can be computed as follows:
Value of firm = 10 million (1-.20) / (.10-.03) = $114.28 million
The difference between the two values then becomes the value added by growth:
Value of growth = Value of firm – Value of assets in place = $114.28 - $100 = $14.28 million

Determinants of the value of growth
            If you accept the proposition that growth creates a trade off of lower cash flows today for higher ones in the future, you have the three ingredients that determine the value of growth. The first is the level of growth, with higher growth rates in the future generating higher earnings over time. The second is how long these high growth rates can be sustained before the company becomes too big to keep growing (at least at rates higher than that of the economy). The third and most critical is the return on capital you generate on new investments.

To see why the last ingredient is so critical, revisit the last example and make the return on capital = cost of capital. If you do so, the reinvestment rate has to be 30% to sustain the expected growth rate of 3%. The value of growth then becomes zero:
Value of firm = 10 million (1-.30) / (.10-.03) = $100 million
Value of growth = Value of firm – Value of assets in place = $100 - $100 = $ 0
In fact, if the return on capital generated on new investments is less than the cost of capital, growth can destroy value.

The process of valuing growth does get a little more complicated when you set higher growth rates, but the logic and conclusions do not change. If the return on capital > cost of capital, the value of growth will increase as the growth rate increases and the length of the growth period expands. If the return on capital = cost of capital, neither the growth rate nor the length of the growth period affect value and if the return on capital < cost of capital, the value will move inversely with the growth rate and the length of the growth period. If you want to take this concept out for a trial run, this spreadsheet can help you. 

Comparing the value of growth to the price paid for growth
If you are paying a price for growth, it is always useful to know the value of this growth. If you accept the reasoning in the last section, it follows that it is not growth that you should be paying a premium for but “quality growth”, with quality defined as the excess return you generate over and above the cost of capital. To illustrate this concept, we compute “intrinsic” PE ratios at varying growth rates for three firms, all of which share a cost of capital of 10% but vary in the returns on capital that they earn on new investments (one has a return on capital of 8%, the second has a return on capital of 10% and the third has a return on capital of 12%).
The PE ratio for just the assets in place is 11.63 and remains unchanged, even if you introduce growth, for a firm that earns its cost of capital. For the firm that generates a return on capital < cost of capital, the PE ratio decreases as growth increases, reflecting value destruction in action. For a firm that generates a return on capital > cost of capital, the PE ratio does increase (the growth premium) as growth increases. It is this premium that you would compare to what you actually pay to make a judgment on whether the added PE you are paying for growth is justified.

Price of Growth versus Value of Growth
Using the spreadsheet on growth as a device for deconstructing growth (and its value), I looked at Microsoft, Kraft, Google and Linkedin. In the table below, I have listed my base assumptions for each company and the value of assets in place and expected growth in each one:

This table can be used to address several issues relating to growth:
a. Price of growth versus value of growth: You can compare the price you are paying for growth with the value of growth, and you come to different conclusions. For Microsoft, where the value of assets in place covers the market price you are paying, the value of growth is a pure bonus. For Kraft, the value of growth is negative, since the firm earns less than its cost of capital, and the price you are paying for growth is therefore too high. For Google, the price of growth is almost exactly equal to the value of growth, making it the only fair priced stock in this grouping. Finally, for Linkedin, the price paid for growth is more than twice the value of that growth, making the stock over valued. For investors who believe in growth at a reasonable price (GARP), this is the statistic worth watching.
b. Implied growth rates: An alternative approach is to solve for that growth rate (Look at the spreadsheet and follow the instructions), holding the return on capital and length of growth period fixed, that would yield the price you paid for that growth. Linkedin, for instance, would have to maintain a compounded growth rate of 73% a year (instead of the estimated growth rate of 60% a year) for the next ten years to justify the price you are paying for the growth. (The spreadsheet provides instructions on how to back out the implied growth rate using the Goal seek function in Excel.)

Growth, in summary, does not yield itself easily to rules of thumb or broad generalizations. In some firms, it can be worth nothing, as is argued by strict value investors, whereas in others, it can be worth a great deal, lending credence to the arguments of growth investors. 

How much are you paying for growth?

The debate about Facebook’s valuation is interesting on many dimensions, but one that is worth focusing on is how much growth is worth, and what you are paying for it. At one extreme are some value investors who argue that growth is “speculative” and that it is  worth very little or nothing. At the other are those who argue that growth is priceless and that you should therefore be willing to pay a “fortune” for it. Both groups seem to be in agreement that valuing growth is pointless, because it requires estimates that will be wrong in hindsight.  I had a series of posts on growth a few months ago looking at the limits of growth, the scaling up of growth, the value of growth and how management credibility affects that value. In this post, I offer a simple technique for assessing how much you are paying for growth in a company. In the next one, I address how to value that growth.

Growth Assets and Assets in Place
To provide a perspective on how growth and value interact, it is best to start with what I would call a financial balance sheet.

While it is structured like an accounting balance sheet, it is different on two counts. First, rather than break assets down into fixed, current and financial assets, as accounting balance sheets do, assets are broken down into two categories: “assets in place”, representing the value of investments already made and “growth assets”, measuring the value added by expected future growth. Second, accounting balance sheets are rooted in the past, with numbers representing capital originally invested in assets, whereas financial balance sheets are forward looking, with the values of these assets being based on their capacity to generate cash flows or on market values.

The value of assets in place
To understand the price you are paying for growth, consider a simple experiment. A business that has existing assets that are generating earnings has two choices. It can pay the entire income out to claimholders (as dividends to stockholders and interest to lenders ) and forsake future growth. Alternatively, it can reinvest some (or all) of its earnings back into new investments and generate growth for the future. If you adopt the no growth alternative, your earnings from the most recent period will be your cash flow each year in perpetuity.  The value of these cash flows can be computed by discounting back at a cost of capital to yield a value for assets in place:
Value of assets in place = After-tax Operating Income from most recent period/ Cost of capital
Note that the depreciation & amortization from the most recent period is reinvested back into the business to keep its earnings power intact.

There are only three estimation inputs that you need to derive this value. The first is the operating income. While it is convenient to use the operating income from the most resent year as the base value, you may choose to use an average over a few years for cyclical and commodity companies. The second is the tax rate. Again, while the effective tax rate is the easiest to access, you may decide to replace it with a marginal tax rate, if you feel that the company will revert to that rate over time. The third is the cost of capital. While you can compute the cost of capital for the firm in question, it may be far simpler to use the average cost of capital for the sector in which the firm operates. There is one variant worth considering. If you feel that the assets of the face obsolescence, you may decide to assume that the earnings from these assets will be available only for a finite period rather than forever. The equation for value of assets in place has to be modified to be an annuity, instead of a perpetuity.

Price paid for growth: DCF
Once you have derived a value for assets in place, you can estimate what you are paying for growth by looking at the traded value of the firm, computed as the enterprise value of the business (market value of equity plus debt minus cash). The difference between the traded enterprise value and the value of the assets in place can be considered the price paid for growth.

In the table below, we look at four firms, Microsoft, Kraft, Google and Linkedin, to illustrate this concept.

For each firm, we report the after-tax operating income and the cost of capital used to derive the value of the assets in place. By comparing this number to the enterprise value of the firm, we then compute, on a percent basis, the proportion of the price that goes towards growth.  What are we to make of these numbers? For Microsoft, you can justify the entire market value of the firm with the value of just assets in place.  For Kraft and Google, about 40% of the price paid is for expected future growth. For Linkedin, it is almost 99% of the value. Does the fact that Microsoft's entire value is justified by assets in place make it  a better investment than Linkedin? Not necessarily, since we have not valued growth explicitly and growth can destroy value. In my next post, I will look at the value of growth at each of these companies and consequences for investors who have paid much higher prices.

Note that this entire analysis can also be done in purely equity terms, with net income divided by cost of equity to derive the growth value in equity in assets in place. If you do so, you can compare the market capitalization (rather than enterprise value) of the firm to the assets in place. The difference will be the price paid for growth.

Price paid for growth: Relative valuation
High growth companies often trade at high multiples of earnings, book value or revenues and the “premium’ is usually justified as the price for growth.  This premium can be in enterprise value multiples, such as EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales or EV/Invested capital:
EV growth premium = Actual EV multiple - EV multiple for assets in place
With Google, for instance, the EV/EBIT multiple for just assets in place can be computed to be 7.90, obtained by dividing the intrinsic value of assets in place ($92,761 million) by the operating income ($11,742 million). It's actual EV/EBIT multiple is 13.01, estimated by dividing the actual enterprise value of $152,784 million by the same operating income. The growth premium in the EV/EBIT multiple is therefore 5.11 (13.01- 7.90).

The premium can also be stated in terms of price earnings ratios, as the difference between the PE ratio that you actually pay compared to the PE ratio that you would pay for just the assets in place.
PE premium = Actual PE ratio - PE ratio for assets in place
You can estimate the PE ratio for assets in place, either from the cost of equity directly (PE ratio for assets in place = 1/ Cost of equity) or by backing the equity value from the intrinsic value of assets in place (and subtracting out the debt and adding back cash). Using Google as an example again (with debt of $4,204 million, cash of $44,460 million and net income of $9,737 million):
Intrinsic value of equity in assets in place = $ 92,761 - $4,204 + $ 44,460 = $132,818
PE for assets in place = $132,818/ $9,737 = 13.64
Actual PE = $192,840/$9,737 = 19.80
Growth premium in PE = 19.80 - 13.64 = 6.26

Saturday, 17 December 2011

Do markets punish long term thinking? Amazon as a case study

This morning's New York Times has an article from one my favorite business writers, James Stewart, on Amazon. His focus, largely admiring, is on the fact that Amazon has made decisions that hurt it in the short term but create value in the long term. To provide at least two examples, he talks about Amazon's decisions to cut prices on products and go for a larger market share and to invest in in the Kindle, their book reader. The tenor of the article is that the market has short sightedly punished the company for its long term focus. Stewart uses one piece of anecdotal evidence to back up his claim that markets are short term: the stock price reaction to the earnings report on October 25, when Amazon announced earnings and revenues that were largely as expected but announced that it had been spending a great deal more than investors thought it had to deliver that growth.

I am no knee jerk defender of financial markets and accept the fact that markets not only make mistakes in assessing value, but also that a subset of investors are short term and over react to earnings announcements. In fact, I am sure that there are companies that you can point to that have been unfairly treated by markets for their long term focus (and other companies that have been unfairly rewarded for delivering short term results at the expense of long term value). I just don't think Amazon is the example I would use to bring this point on. Let's start with some general facts. Here is how the market has and is continuing to punish Amazon for its long term focus.
  • In the last decade, Amazon has seen its market capitalization increase from $4.55 billion in 2001 to $82 billion in 2011; the market cap for Amazon at the peak of the dot com boom was only $30 billion. An investor who bought Amazon stock in 2001 would have generated a cumulated return of 1300% over the last 10 years. 
  • In November 2011, after the earnings report that Mr. Stewart alludes to, Amazon was trading at 96 times trailing earnings and at two times trailing revenues. In contrast, the median PE ratio for a retail firm was about 15 and the median EV to revenue multiples was 0.8. By my estimate, Amazon is one of the most richly priced large retailers in the world.
  • Over the last decade, the firm has made multiple bets on growth and asked the market to trust it to make the right judgments. For the most part, its actions have been welcomed by markets that have been willing to look past disappointing earnings reports at the future. Jeff Bezos is celebrated as a great CEO, with comparisons made to Steve Jobs.
So, why was the market reaction to Amazon's last earnings report so brutal? As someone who has valued Amazon almost every year since 1998, I think I can provide some historical perspective. Amazon has been, at alternate times, revered and reviled by financial markets. In January 2000, at the peak of the dot com boom, based on my estimate of value for Amazon at the time, it was over valued by about 60%. A year later, based again on my assessment of value, it was under valued by about 50%. During the 12 years that I have valued the company, it has been overvalued in 7 of the years and under valued in 5 of those years. Since the beginning of 2009, notwithstanding the reaction to the last earnings report, investors have been on their manic phase with Amazon, pushing the stock price up more than 300% (from $54 to over $200). At its price of almost $200/share, just before its October earnings report, Amazon was valued to perfection and beyond. In fact, for it to be worth $200/share, it would have to deliver about increase revenues to more than $200 billion in ten years, while increasing its pre-tax operating margin from 2.5% to 4%, while generating a return on capital of 70%+ on its new investments. If you disagree on these assumptions, feel free to change them for yourself in the attached spreadsheet.

It is the last item that I would draw your attention to, because the last earnings report was a sobering reminder that while Amazon will continue to grow, the growth is not going to be easy or cheap. In my view, the market is still much too optimistic about the quality of Amazon's growth going forward and I think it remains over priced. In Mr. Stewart's world, that would make me a short term investor, but not in mine. At the risk of repeating a theme that has run through my posts for the last few months, growth has value only if it is delivered at a reasonable cost and a growth stock is cheap only if the market price reflects that cost. Amazon does not look cheap to me, even with a great CEO and a long term focus!